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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the requirements for establishing
security criteria in designing and developing a local area
network (LAN) for an aviation squadron. In particular, it
concentrates on the security problems and control issues in
the design of a LAN. A survey of the security literature on
computer security was conducted to develop a model for
identifying security problems in a local area network and
devise control solutions. A case study was written based on
the literature review and previous experience in the aviation
community. Although many controls solutions are discussed,
adequate planning, common sense and proper user training all
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The 1990's will see information processed faster, cheaper
and a significant increase in networking of computers.
Indeed, local area networks (LANs) are becoming more popular
with the proliferation of microcomputers in the work place.
The reason for the local area network (LAN) popularity is
described by Chorafas' statement "that the essence of the
personal computer (PC) and LAN revolution is individual access
at an affordable price." [Ref. l:p. 9] As LANs have expanded
in the work place, problems have developed which should have
been anticipated in the design and planning phase of the
project.
In this age of information technology, computer security
is a basic concern in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
Department of the Navy (DoN). Microcomputer security is a
relatively new arena that involves many of the old mainframe
security issues plus new problem areas in microcomputers and
networks.
Two important issues to consider in the design of a local
area network (LAN) are security and control. Security deals
with more than the protection of classified information in a
LAN. Security topics for any compute :-ystem include such
areas as service denial, damage, unintentional harm and
viruses. Security and control measures are equally important
in an unclassified environment when dealing with sensitive or
personal information. These areas will be discussed in the
thesis.
The addition of more microcomputers can create highly
dispersed, redundant databases and possibly inefficient use of
computer hardware.
In an atmosphere of budget cuts and monetary restraint,
the Navy should start to focus on establishing local area
networks to share software, hardware and information. With
the expansion of microcomputers in Navy aviation squadrons, it
is feasible to buy local area networks and resolve this
problem.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to identify security
problems and control solutions in the design of local area
networks. After identifying the issues and the areas to
examine, a case study is presented to demonstrate the
security concerns in a network environment. It can be used to
raise security awareness of officers in charge of implementing
LANs at Navy aviation squadrons.
The second objective is to outline security and control
issues and their importance in LANs and microcomputers.
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C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The research question is "What are the security problems
and control solutions in a local area network design for an
aviation squadron?" These issues should be addressed in the
planning and design phase to avoid unnecessary cost for
additional software and future expansion.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The main thrust of the thesis concentrates on the security
and control issues in the design of a local area network in an
unclassified environment. The issues addressed are
appropriate for all aviation squadrons.
This thesis does not suggest a particular local area
network architecture for a squadron or develop a cost\benefit
analysis of a local area network. Both of these topics are
suggested follow-on topics to this thesis.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A literature review was conducted to compile all the
security and control issues in a LAN environment. Department
of Defense (DoD) and Department of the Navy (DoN) instructions
on computer security and networks were included in the review.
A review of all theses completed on LANs at the Naval
Postgraduate School was completed to examine the depth that
previous theses researched into the security and control
issues. Omission of security issues in the iter design was
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a primary limitation on all previous local area network
theses.
A survey of the security literature was conducted to
develop a model for identifying security problems in a local
area network and devise control solutions. A case study was
written from the literature review material.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
A case study is provided in Chapter II to help understand
security and control issues in a patrol aviation squadron
before purchasing a network. Chapter III is a general
overview of LAN characteristics. Chapter IV presents
classifications of security problems in a local area network.
The security issues include hardware security, software
security, physical security, communication security and human
related security. Chapter V proposes a taxonomy of control
solutions in local area networks. The control issues include
but are not limited to access controls, data controls,
communication controls and management controls. Chapter VI
summarizes the findings of this study and formulates
recommendations for future research.
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II. A CASE STUDY APPROACH TO ADDRESS
SECURITY PROBLEMS IN LANS
A. INTRODUCTION
The case study is designed for classroom/workshop
discussion on security and control issues in computer systems
and local area networks. The case study should assist
students examine different problems in security when designing
a local area network.
The case has the following educational objectives:
- To identify the security issues involved in a local area
network.
- To develop control and management solutions to resolve
the security problems.
- To enable the student to gain an appreciation of the
security issues in an unclassified network environment.
B. A CASE STUDY FOR A NAVY AVIATION SQUADRON
Originally Patrol Squadron 31 was chosen as the squadron
upon which to base the case. This determination was made
because of the size of the command and the number of
microcomputers (Zenith-248's) in the squadron. After further
study it was determined tc discuss a generic squadron case
study instead of a specific squadron. The typical squadron
has had an inventory consisting of between four to six
personal computers (PCs). An International Data Corporation
(IDC) report released in September 1989 stated that the
5
average number of microcomputers or nodes in a typical network
was 9.51 in 1989. IDC forecast that the average node per LAN
will be 14.35 by the end of 1993. [Ref. 2:p. 41] Figure 2.1
depicts the average nodes per LAN from 1986 to 1989.
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Source: [Ref. 2:p. 42]
Figure 2.1 Average Nodes Per LAN
This case does not reflect the current or past environment
in any patrol aviation squadron. Ninety percent of the
information discussed in the case study is from the literature
rci - . Personal experience from two patrol aviation commands
and observations as command inspection coordinator on an
o~ro-.c, as staff add some reality to the case.
• • • • m • m
C. A CASE STUDY: LAN PATROL
As the fog began to rise over the runway, the morning
drizzle at Naval Air Station (NAS) Whidbey Island, Washington
started to subside. NAS Whidbey Island is the home port of
Patrol Squadron FORTY-TWO (VP-42).
VP-42 is one of five operational fleet patrol aviation (P-
3C) squadrons. The primary mission of patrol aviation is to
detect and track enemy submarines. The squadron is composed
of approximately 40 officers and 200 enlisted personnel.
The Executive Officer (XO) of VP-42 is Commander (CDR)
"Buss" Ether. CDR Ether just completed reading an article in
the local newspaper on the effectiveness and capabilities of
local area networks (LANs). After writing the advantages and
disadvantages of a LAN on a note pad (Table 2.1), the XO
decided to talk to the Commanding Officer (CO). The XO walked
into the Commanding Officer's office to explain the benefits
of a local area network (LAN).
The Commanding Officer is CDR "Bull" Zenith. A salty
Naval Flight Officer (NFO) who has spent more time tracking
submarines while in the head (bathroom) than most Lieutenants
have tracking submarines for their career.
After knocking on the CO's door, the XO stepped into the
office. "CO, I think it is time for this squadron to acquire
a local area network."
The CO stated, "Well XO, what are the advantages of a
local area network? How much will it cost?"
The XO paused and remembered from the article a few
advantages. "CO, the first advantage is that we will be able
to send electronic mail (E-mail) to all the departments.
Another advantage is a centralized database and sharing of
computer resources like the new laser printer. I have listed




ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTACES OF A LAN
Advantages
1. Electronic mail will save time on memo's and save
individuals from searching the spaces for someone.
2. Resource sharing of advance equipment.
3. Elimination of redundant databases.
4. Access to other networks.
Disadvantages
1. Games being played on the network.
2. Possibility of viruses.
3. Expense of maintaining network.
4. More computer training required.
5. Someone to manage.
6. The current system does not require additional
funds.
"Thanks XO." As the CO turned to his organizational
chart on the wall (Figure 2.2) he stated, "OK XO, let's assign
one of our new Lieutenant Commanders to review the security
issues and report his findings."
XO stated, "I will put Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Token
in charge."
LCDR Token stepped out of his car and headed towards the
Executive Officer's office to discuss his first job in the
squadron. As LCDR "Ringer" Token stepped into the XO's office
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Figure 2.2 Unit Organization
"Good morning, 'Ringer' Please sit down so I can discuss
your new job. You are going to be the new Administration
Officer and the CO has tasked you with a small project. The
command is interested in buying a local area network (LAN).
I want you to look into the security problems involved in a
LAN. I believe that security in this type environment is
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small so the project should be done quickly. Do some research
and draft a response to the CO."
"Yes, Sir. Although I am a PC novice, this should be an
interesting task."
LCDR Token started his research by finding an inventory of
the personal computers in the command. The computers and
locations are summarized in Table 2.2.
TABLE 2.2
COMPUTER RESOURCES AT VP-42
COMPUTER DEPARTMENT NUMBER USE
Unisys-386 Administration 2 word processing,
graphics
Unisys-386 Operations 1 word processing,
spreadsheet
Unisys-386 Maintenance 2 word processing,
spreadsheet,
database
Unisys-386 Training 1 word processing
Zenith-248 Safety 1 word processing
Zenith-248 Tactics 1 word processing
LCDR Token reviewed the Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
Security Manual and pertinent instructions on local area
networks. He researched various computer magazines on local
area networks including LAN Magazine and felt a little more
comfortable about the security issues. Sitting at a computer
terminal, Ringer attempted to get his ideas in order. First,
he had to find his diskettes. He always had a habit of
leaving the diskettes by the computer and usually unlabeled.
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Since the computer was already on, he wasted no time typing in
his ideas.
LCDR Token's assistant for the project was LT Joe Hacker.
Joe is the computer wizard of the squadron and usually spends
more time trying to sell computers to his squadron mates than
actually doing his job. Joe tells LCDR Token not to worry
about purchasing a virus checker because he copied a program
off a reliable public bullo in board. Joe is excited about
the new LAN and can not wait to copy the latest version of
WordPerfect and the latest spreadsheet software.
At the weekly Tuesday department head meeting, the CO
asked for suggestion on security measures to be considered for
a local area network. Ideas on the subject should be given to
LCDR Token by the following Friday.
CDR "Smithy" Corona is the LDO Maintenance Officer. "We
don't need a LAN. We only use the computers for word
processing. Sounds like this could be an expense adventure.
I would rather have a couple of typewriters and a good
typist."
After the meeting, "Ringer" needed a breath of fresh
air.
As "Ringer" was walking back to his office, he was stopped
by LCDR Bill Compaq.
Bill: "Ringer, can I talk to you for a few minutes in my
office."
Ringer: "Sure."
Bill: "Ringer, I heard rumors that the local area network
is going to have many security features and
controls. You realize if you have too many controls
nobody will use the system."
Ringer: "Bill, we are just in the design phase. I have to
make a recommendation on what type of security the
LAN should have to the CO. I believe that -Prs
should use the PC lock on the front of the computer
and a password to enter the LAN."
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Bill: "People don't use that key. Most people keep the
key in the computer or hide the key so they don't
lose it. Additionally, I think using passwords on
an unclassified LAN is a bad idea. I have enough
items to memorize now."
Ringer: "Don't worry about the password. The password will
be easy to remember and each department will have
the same password.
Bill: "Passwords will not work. The user will write the
password down and probably post it on the computer."
Ringer: "Bill, I know you are not an expert on local area
networks. I believe the unclassified network has
two basic threats. The first threat is viruses that
can cause denial of service."
Bill: "Ringer, viruses are not a threat, that is all media
hype. I can not remember a single virus that has
infected our stand alone computers."
Ringer: "Bill, viruses can do damage. The LAN has to have
an anti-virus program for detection of viruses.
This program will be on the network so users can
test for viruses. Additionally, the access to
computer bulletin boards should be restricted."
Bill: "What, I think you are going too far. If I am not
busy at work, I want to use the bulletin boards.
Bulletin boards have excellent anti-virus software
that we can use for free. The bulletin boards have
graphic programs that can be installed on the
network. Also, the computer bulletin boards are
local calls."
Ringer: "First, bulletin boards should not be used for
playing at work. Second, some bulletin boards are
toll calls."
Bill: "I don't agree with you. What is the second
threat?"
Ringer: "I believe the second threat is the user."
Bill: "The user. How can the user be a threat?"
Ringer: "I read an article that stated that more data is
lost by non-malicious destruction of data by the
user than through planned intrusion."
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Bill: "Ringer, I disagree. The user is your greatest
asset."
Ringer: "True, but the user can also be the greatest
liability. People are not going to admit that they
made a mistake. A backup system should be
established to recover lost data. Also, training of
the user is an important issue. The user can be the
greatest asset if he/she is properly educated."
Bill: "Well, you may be right about the user. What type
of electrical protection will the system have?"
Ringer: "I believe surge protection should be adequate."
Bill: "Ringer, you sound like an expert on these security
measures. I vote for you as the LAN manager."
Ringer: "Bill, this is a small network of eight computers.
A LAN manager is not required."
Bill: "Ringer, thanks for your time. I just want to
repeat that controls are unnecessary in an
unclassified environment. I believe the more
controls imposed on the user the less productive the
users will be."
Ringer: "Bill, thanks for your advice. I will do some more
research on the subject."
The following week Token received the responses from all
the department heads. Most of the department heads agreed on
some restriction on access to the network. All the
departments wanted access to the network from their house.
The department heads had three concerns about threats to
the system. The major threat was denial of service if the
system went down. The integrity of the data was the second
threat. Finally, the confidentiality of sensitive data was
the third threat.
Since the Department Heads had various ideas, "Ringer"
decided to have a discussion meeting on LAN security. He
invited the Operations Officer, Training Officer and the
Maintenance Officer.
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Operations Officer: "Ringer, I think we all agree that a
backup system is required for a LAN. Of course,
backups are essential for natural disasters."
Training Officer: "I agree. Also, we should have audit
trails to detect and determine problems."
Ringer: OK guys. Who has the time to read all the
information from the audit reports."
Training Officer: "I believe the Administrative Officer has
plenty of time."
Ringer: "Thanks, but let's get back to the issues."
Operations Officer: "I believe the LAN should be centrally
located. A cipher lock on the door will eliminate
many of our physical security problems. The central
location will make environmental protection items
such as no eating or smoking easier to enforce."
CDR Corona: "I disagree. A centrally located LAN is not
convenient or practical. The hangar is three
football fields long. I will have no one to answer
the phones. The LAN should be in the work spaces."
Ringer: "Well, I guess the CO will make the ultimate
decision on the location of the LAN. Is the network
cabling an issue? I read fiber optics is superior
protection against tapping into the network."
CDR Corona: "Ringer, fiber optics may be out of our price
range. I don't believe a threat is an intruder
tapping into cable. The intruder probably could
learn more about our operation from the local
newspaper."
Ringer: "Well, if tapping into our cable is not a major
consideration for cabling, what is?
CDR Corona: "I am not an expert on cabling, but I would bet
shielding against noise should be a consideration."
Training Officer: "I agree. Noise immunity may play a
large factor in a noisy hangar environment. I bet
an electric pencil sharpener can play havoc on a
unshielded cable network."
Operations Officer: "I guess the big question is whether we
should have unlimited access to the network. I
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believe unlimited access in this unclassified
environment is justified."
CDR Corona: "I disagree with unlimited access. We need
some type of restrictions on files and directories.
Everyone does not need access to all files. Fitness
reports and enlisted evaluation can contain
sensitive information. Additionally, users may get
lazy and place classified information on the
network."
Ringer: "I agree with the CDR Corona. Unlimited access is
asking for security problems. Privacy Act
information such as social security number, medical
history and home address must be protected.
Passwords may be required."
Training officer: "Passwords are necessary. I think
another solution may be to limit copying of
diskettes by using diskless PCs."
CDR Corona: "First, we should connect the computers in the
inventory and monitor the capability of the LAN.
Second, I want to be able to use the computer when
the network is down. I don't believe diskless PCs
have that capability."
Ringer: "The last item to discuss is computer training.
Operations Officer: "Our personnel are adequately trained.
I think a basic introduction into LAN operation and
security should be adequate. Experience is the best
training."
CDR Corona: "I want to emphasize that we are not dealing
with sophisticated computer hackers in our
organization. We are deal- with users who make
honest mistakes. They -nould be adequately
trained."
Operations Officer: "I think one area we should emphasize
is user accountability. Everyone is accountable for
their actions and this should be incorporated into
security awareness training.
Ringer: "I would like to thank every one for coming today
but our time is up. Thanks again."
After compiling all the data, "Ringer" decided it was time
to eat. As "Ringer" was walking to lunch, he was stopped by
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Lieutenant (LT) Bob Smith. LT Smith is the Communications
Officer. "Ringer, when the LAN is installed I will order a
Tempest check on the network. If the system passes Tempest,
then we can place classified information on the network."
"Bob, this is an unclassified network. No classified
information will be allowed."
"OK 'Ringer', I am just planning."
As "Ringer" started to write his proposal he had a
dilemma. He already knew that the XO felt that the security
issues were small items. He also knew that he would be
working closely with the XO as the Administration Officer. He
believed that definite areas needed addressing and decided to
make the following recommendations:
- Recover system using backups required.
- Audit trails unnecessary.
- Anti-virus software on the network.
- Modem capability required. Therefore, remote logins
authorized with a call back feature from the
communication server.
- Train users on the fundamentals of the LAN.
- Minimal controls to increase productivity.
- Software purchased to blank screen when no key strokes in
ten minutes.
- A risk assessment is not required since we had one three
years ago and the assessment is good for five years.
- Limited access to the network with passwords required.
As "Ringer" was leaving the hangar, the clouds were
returning for more rain. He wondered how secure a network





The case study is designed to examine security issues
in a local area network (LAN). The case was developed so the
students can discuss the problems and various control
solutions. The student should be able to link the security
problems with control measures after studying the case. This
case assumes the student has basic security awareness.
2. Session Structure
The focus should be on security concerns when
designing a LAN. What are the major security problems? How
can they be resolved? Are hardware and software controls the
only answer to a true secure system? Additional topics area
discussed in the case were resistance to change, controls
versus productivity, and perceptions that security is
uninportant in a unclassified environment.
3. Class Discussion
The case was written in such a way that the officers
in the case identified only partial solutions. The students
can list the problems discussed and examine how each problem
was handled. The following questions could also help direct
the students to critical security issues.
- What are the security issues in this case?
- How validate are "Ringer's" recommendations?
- How important are the roles of the LAN's users in the
successful implementation of a security program?
17
All the technical and managerial elements necessary to
address security are developed in the remaining chapters of
this thesis.
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III. BASIC LAN TERMINOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Before examining the security issues in a local area
network, a brief discussion of LANs is presented for
individuals not familiar with LANs. This chapter is a general
overview of LAN characteristics. This is not a thorough
description of LANs and can be skipped with no loss in
continuity. For more technical information on local area
networks the following books could be recommended: Local Area
Networks: The Second Generation by Thomas W. Madron and
Computer Networks, 2nd ed., by Andrew S. Tanenbaum.
The question is "What is a local area network?"
A local area network consists of a set of nodes which
are interconnected by a set of links. The nodes may be
terminals, microcomputers, minicomputers, mainframes,
printers, hard disks or workstations. The links may be
coaxial cable, twisted pair wires or fiber optic cable.
[Ref. 3:p. 1]
In simple terms, a LAN connects computers together to
share resources of information, hardware and has the ability
to send messages within the network.
LANs usually have the following three characteristics
[Ref. 4:p. 1171:
- A diameter of not more than a few kilometers. The LAN is
usually networked in the same building or adjacent
buildings.
- A total data rate of at least several million bits per
second (MBPS).
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Ownership by a single organization.
Advantages of a LAN art [Ref 5:pp. 169-175]:
LANs facilitate resource sharing of data, processing
capabilities, data storage, communication lines, and
output devices such as laser printers.
Devices may be added to the network as the need arises.
This is called modularity and provides for an orderly
growth of services.
LAN has electronic mail capability which allows messages
to be sent from one linked computer to another.
B. LAN ARCHITECTURE
There are basically two logical architectures "that are
supported on PC LANs today--peer-to-peer and client/server
architectures." [Ref. 6:p. 51]
The peer-to-peer architecture "requires no dedicated file
server because any node on the network may selectively share
its local hard disk with other nodes on the network." [Ref.
6:p. 51] Since no additional hardware is required and the
cost-per-node is usually lower, the peer-to-peer is a favorite
choice of smaller organizations. The problem with peer-to-
peer is a lack of a centralized database and lower
performance. [Ref. 6:p. 51]
In the client/server irchitecture, services are provided
by a file and a print server. The file and print server "do
not provide any direct user application support, but provide
an optimized design for file level I/O requests and spooled
print services." [Ref. 6:p. 52]
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The higher cost of a client/server architecture is "offset
by higher performance and more sophisticated security provided
by the software." [Ref. 6:p. 52] The advantages are the
client/server provides better control of user access and
backup operations than the peer-to-peer architecture.
There are three types of servers which are file servers,
print servers and communication servers. The server "contains
the hardware and at least part of the software, necessary to
produce the service." [Ref. 7:p. 15]
Servers are usually located remote from the user and are
"designed for multi-user access to expensive, complicated, or
infrequently used services." [Pef. 7:p. 16]
A communication server "is a separate machine on the LAN
that allows network users to con'ri.t to the outside world
through one modem." [Ref. 8:p. 105] Communication servers
are usually called either - te;:ay's or bridges. Gateways
contain the "hardware and software necessary for two
technologically different networks to communicate with one
another." [Ref. 7 :p. 18] For example, an ethernet and a
token ring are connected via a gateway [Ref. 7:p. 18].
Ethernets and token ring terminology are discussed in Section
D of this chapter.
Bridges are used to link two technologically similar
networks. Combining two Ethernets would use a bridge. [Ref.
7:p. 18]
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C. TOPOLOGY AND ACCESS PROCEDURES
Topology is the network contiguration. The topology is
described by Charles P. Pfleeger:
A single computing system in a network is often called
a node, and its processor (computer) is called a host. A
connection between two hosts is known as a link, and the
pattern of links in a network is called the topology of the
network. [Ref. 9:p. 368]








A point-to-point is a simple network. It consists of a
computer connected to one terminal. Multipoint is an
extension of point-to-point in that instead of one remote
terminal "there are multiple remote terminals." [Ref. 7:p.
11] A local network will normally have intelligence at all or
most points on the system without the necessity for any
central system. [Ref. 7:p. 13]
The star topology uses a centralized computer. All nodes
communicate through the central computer.
The ring topology "is organized by connecting network
nodes in a closed loop with each node linked to those adjacent
on the right and left." [Ref. 7:p. 13]
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The bus topology connects all the computers to one line or
backbone. All the computers on the bus topology listen for a
message for them.
The hierarchical network is a "fully distributed network
in which computers feed into computers that in turn feed into
computers." [Ref. 7:p. 13]
Figure 3.1 depicts the network topologies. The three most




Source: [Ref. 7:p. 153
Figure 3.1 Network Topologies
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The topologies 'may be grouped according to the way in
which signals are passed within them." [Ref. 5:p. 182]
Broadcast and sequential are techniques for propagating
signals that contain information. [Ref. 5:p. 182]
In broadcast, signals "are sent simultaneously to all
nodes on the network." [Ref. 5:p. 182] Because each node has
the possibility to communicate simultaneously, each node is in
contention for the line.
The bus and star topologies support the broadcast mode.
The main advantages are responsiveness and speed in a moderate
size network. The disadvantages of the broadcast mode include
extra expenses of detection and correction of collisions on
the contention line and high installation expense. [Ref. 5:p.
182]
The sequential mode is used for point-to-point or ring
topologies to pass data messages. Control is passed from one
node to another to send or receive messages.
Network topology and access procedures are closely
related. Access procedures are the rules for the nodes or
microcomputers to communicate with each other on the network.
These access procedures include [Ref. 5:p. 184]:





CSMA/CD is a collision-handling scheme that avoids the
possibility of two nodes communicating at the same time on the
network. CSMA/CD is used in broadcast topologies and has good
performance at low to medium loads. The disadvantage is no
guarantee of transmission for the node. [Ref. 5:p. 184]
The Token ring uses sequential control to give access to
each node via a token. The token ring access method is "used
within ring topologies that handle messages as discrete
packets." [Ref. 5:p. 185] A token bus approach combines the
broadcast characteristics of a bus topology with the control
features of token-passing schemes. [Ref. 5:p. 185]
D. TRANSMISSION MEDIA
Local area networks use various media to provide services.
The transmission medium is the physical connection
between network transmitters (sources) and receivers
(destinations), bridging the distance between them. It may
be a pair of wires, coaxial cable, radio waves, optical
fibers, or infrared transmissions through the atmosphere.
[Ref. 10:p. 35]
In designing a local area network, and for security
purposes, the organization must consider the "characteristics
of the medium, immunity to noise, and cost." [Ref. 10:p. 35]
The most common types of transmission medium are twisted
pair copper cables, coaxial cables and fiber optics.
The oldest ard most common transmission medium is twisted
pair. "The twisted form is used to reduce electrical
interference to similar pairs close by." [Ref. 4:p. 58] The
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telephone system was the most common application of twisted
pair.
A problem with twisted pair is that "copper wire has
limitations for data transmission over distances of any
magnitude." [Ref. 7:p. 27]
A coaxial cable consists of a stiff copper wire as the
core, surrounded by an insulating material. The insulator
is encased by a cylindrical conductor, often as a closely
woven braided mesh. The outer conductor is covered in a
protective plastic sheath. [Ref. 4:p. 58]
Coaxial cable is better than twisted pair in noisy
environments. Coaxial cable is either baseband or broadband.
Baseband coaxial is digital and uses a 50 ohm cable. The
advantages include excellent noise immunity and high
bandwidth.
Broadband coaxial cable is used in cable television and
uses analog transmission. Broadband in computer networks
means "any cable network using analog transmission." [Ref.
4:p. 60]
"One key difference between baseband and broadband is that
broadband systems need analog amplifiers to strengthen the
signal periodically." [Ref. 4:p. 60] "Baseband is simple and
inexpensive to install, and requires inexpensive interfaces."
[Ref. 4:p. 61] Baseband is adequate for data communication up
to a distance of 1 km and is a single digital channel. Broad-
band is multiple channels and can transmit data, voice and
video.
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In fiber optics data are transmitted by pulses of light
through non-conducting glass. "Currently available fiber
optics systems can transmit data at or about 1000 Mbps for 1
km." [Ref. 4:p. 63]
Many of the problems inherent in twisted pair and
coaxial are avoided with fiber optics, although the optic
properties of cable can be affected by kinks or similar
damage. The potential transmission speed of fiber optic
cable is higher than coaxial, and coaxial is higher than
twisted pair. [Ref. 7:p. 28]
Another advantage of fiber optics over coaxial is that
fiber optics can run long distances without repeaters.
"Security is excellent because fiber does not radiate and
wiretappers will have as much trouble as the network owners in
tapping it." [Ref. 4:p. 65]
The disadvantage of fiber optics is its high cost. The
optic cable may be superior for security purposes but may not
be cost effective for information at the unclassified level.
Figure 3.2 depicts the three types of transmission media.
Line-of-sight transmission is sending the data out into
the air. "In particular, transmission by infrared, lasers,
microwave, and radio does not require any physical medium."
[Ref. 4:p. 65] Line-of-sight could be used between buildings
when it may be expensive to dig the road up to lay a cable.
Laser or infrared communication is fully digital, and is
highly directional, making it almost immune to tapping or
jamming. On the other hand, rain and fog may interfere with
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Figure 3.2 Trall-MiSSiOnl Media
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E. LAN STANDARDS OVERVIEW
The International Standards Organization's (ISO) Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model "provides a general
reference framework for LAN standards." [Ref. 7:p. 21] The
model involves "connecting open systems--that is, systems that
are open for communication with other systems." [Ref. 4:p.
14] The OSI model is separated into seven layers or
functions. These seven layers are the physical, data link,
network, transport, session, presentation and application.
The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers
(IEEE) 802 Committee "is attempting to provide standards that
can be used to guide the manufacture of LAN components and
software." [Ref. 7:p. 21]
The standards were written for CSMA/CD, token bus and
token ring. "Standard 802.3 deals with Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)." [Ref. 7:p. 33]
"A token passing bus standard is described by 802.4 standard
and 802.5 defines a token ring system." [Ref. 7 :p. 33]
F. COMPARISON OF LOCAL AREA NETWORKS
This section compares the strength and weaknesses of the
three LAN standards.
CSMA/CD (802.3) is the most widely used today. A major
advantage of CSMA/CD is that stations or nodes do not have to
wait for a token to transmit. Therefore, delay of communicat-
ing at low level is basically zero. [Ref. 4:p. 163]
29
The major disadvantages of CSMA/CD are no priorities for
transmission and drop in efficiency at high loads.
At high load, the presence of collisions becomes a major
problem, and can seriously affect the throughput. 802.3 is
not well suited to fiber optics due to difficulty of
installing taps. [Ref. 4:p. 163]
Token Bus (802.4) uses "highly reliable cable television
equipment." [Ref. 4:p. 163] "It is more deterministic than
802.3 and has excellent throughput and efficiency at high
load." [Ref. 4:p. 164] Token Bus can support data, voice and
video. Since a node must wait for the token to communicate,
the token bus has a "substantial delay at low load." [Ref.
4:p. 164]
The token ring uses point-to-point connections and the
throughput and efficiency at high load are excellent. "The
use of wire centers make the token ring the only LAN that can
detect and eliminate cable failure automatically." [Ref. 4:p.
164]
For people planning to run their LAN in overloaded mode,
802.3 is definitely not the way to go. For people planning
to run with light to moderate load, all three perform well,
so that factors other than performance are probably more
important. [Ref. 4:p. 164]
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a general review of the basics
of local area networks and a general understanding of LAN
terminology. The following chapter presents classifications
of security problems in a local area network.
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IV. CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY PROBLEMS IN LANS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses security in local area networks.
Security issues are compiled from various sources into a
security model. The literature on computer security is
classified into five major areas: hardware security, data
security, data communication security, physical security and
human related security (Figure 4.1).
COMPUTER SECURITY
Hardware Software Physical Data Human
Security com-nuni- related
cation security
Figure 4.1 Components of Computer Security
In establishing a security program, the objectives must be
clear and the threats identified. According to the National
Computer Security Center, the three objectives of information
security are [Ref. 12:p. 2]:
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- Confidentiality of personal, proprietary, or otherwise
sensitive data handled by the system.
- Integrity and accuracy of data and the processes that
handle the data.
- Availability of systems and the data or services they
support.
The threats to accomplishing these objectives include
[Ref. 12:p. 2]:
- Lack of awareness or concern for the implications of
computer security issues.
- Carelessness, errors, or emissions.
- Equipment and media failure hazards.
- Intentional attacks by disgruntled or dishonest
personnel, hackers, or hostile agents.
Different people perceive different threats. Aaron
Brenner in the LAN Tutorial Series for LAN Magazine describes




Physical theft involves employees "stealing computers,
taking floppies with data, and tapping into the cable." [Ref.
13:p. 29] "Electronic tampering covers computer viruses and
malicious reprogramming." [Ref. 13:p. 29] Unauthorized
access involves employees seeing information they shouldn't




a. Lack of Built-in Security Mechanisms
A personal computer has a lack of built-in
security mechanisms. The typical personal computer does not
support the following security mechanisms common to larger
systems [Ref. 12:p. 4]:
- Multiple processor states--enabling separate "domains"
for users and system processes.
- Privileged instructions--limiting access to certain
functions (e.g., reading and writing to disk) to trusted
system processes.
- Memory protection features--preventing unauthorized
access to sensitive parts of the system.
Additionally, "few personal computers have
hardware features that simplify installation of security
measures such as a supervisor mode for sensitive instructions,
hardware addressing limitations, or restricted access to
input/output devices." [Ref. 12:p. 4] For these reasons
"relatively unsophisticated attacks can overcome access
control software or authentication techniques." [Ref. 12:p.
4]
b. Electromagnetic Emanations
Electronic equipment emit electromagnetic signals.
Emanations produced by computers equipment "can be detected
and translated into readable form by monitoring devices."
[Ref. 12:p. 4] "Security measures intended to combat these
33
radio frequency emissions are known as 'Tempest' controls."
[Ref. 14:p. 84]
Tempest-certified hardware is secured from radio
frequency (RF) emanations. The main concern of Tempest
equipment is containment of its own RF signals. [Ref. 14:p.
84]
Although Tempest keeps the data from leaking or
emitting, a relevant comment is made by Belden Merkus, an
independent security consultant,
Tempest does not do all that it is supposed to do
because there are some in the intelligence community who
don't want it to be too good. Sidney Smith, an Anglican
clergyman in England in the late 18th century said that the
rat-catcher does not want to catch all the rats--otherwise
he would be out of business. [Ref. 14:p. 84]
An emerging technology in the transmission of data
in networks is RF LANs. RF LANs "allows very convenient
computer networking without the burden of running cables to
each terminal or computer." [Ref. 15:p. 225] Transmissions
are sent via radio waves. This is a security eavesdropper's
dream for information to be broadcast in the open. [Ref.
15:p. 225]
The U.S. Government has spent a fortune on containing
accidental radio frequency emissions from equipment used in
secure facilities through the TEMPEST program. It seems
ironic that the very latest networking equipment should





When an organization buys software it has an
obligation not to sell copies, use for personal use, or use
extra copies not specified by the license agreement. [Ref.
8:p. 105] Since license softwares are no longer copy
protected, it is increasingly difficult for the organization
to control unauthorized duplication of software.
b. Weaknesses of PC-based Operating Systems
The operating system performs the day-to-day
computer functions automatically so the user is not involved
in the basic operations of the system. MS-DOS is the most
popular disk operating system for IBM-compatible personal
computers. Because MS-DOS is so popular, numerous utilities
are available "to do things like obviate copy protection,
expose disk sub-structures and do sophisticated file/disk
copying." [Ref. 6:p. 51] These utilities "expose all data on
the local workstation or LAN file server to security risks."
[Ref. 6:p. 51]
c. Viruses
Attention has focused recently on security of
computers. National televisicn and the press have stirred
excitement about viruses in computer systems. Viruses are a
small portion of the computer security problem. Peter Coffee
ii PC Week summarized by stating:
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The virus problem is distracting valuable attention from
threats that are far more common. Cheap, simple protection
against those common problems will make you immune to most
of the damage a virus can do. [Ref. 16:p. 46]
First, what is a virus when dealing with
computers?
A virus is a program that can infect other programs by
modifying them. The term virus arises because the infected
program can be modified to include a copy of the virus
program itself, so that the infected program then begins to
act as a virus, infecting other programs. The viruses
eventually overtake the entire computer system. [Ref. 9:p.
178]
A brief history of viruses is important to realize
the threats of a virus. The cases discussed give insight on
how viruses enter the system and possible consequences. It is
important to realize that even viruses or games that were
played in fun can disrupt work and overload the system. A
virus can do damage such as crashing the system, erasure of
data, or destruction of systems programs [Ref. 17:p. 21].
Some famous viruses include the IBM "Christmas
virus," the Lehigh virus, the Jerusalem virus and the Internet
worm. Each of these viruses are unique and will be discussed
in general terms in the following paragraphs.
The IBM "Christmas virus" sent a Christmas
greeting on the electronic mail system on the internal IBM
computer network. When an individual attempted to clear the
screen the virus went into the computer's distribution list
and sent the message to everyone on the list. The Christmas
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greeting spread exponentially through the network and
eventually the network crashed. [Ref. 17:p. 21]
The Lehigh virus is so-named because it was
discovered at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
The Lehigh virus is considered an active virus. "The active
virus is a virus that damages or destroys systems." [Ref.
18:p. 26]
The virus hid in the Disk Operating System (DOS)
in the COMMAND.COM file. This file is executed every time
entries are made into the keyboard. Since the virus hid in
the stack space of the COMMAND.COM file, the file size did not
change. The changing of file size is usually a way to detect
a virus but not in this case. [Ref. 18:p. 26]
Once the virus was in place, whenever a user typed a DOS
command, the virus would check to see if there was a non-
infected COVMAND.COM file on the system. If so, it infected it
and incremented a counter that kept track of how many other
disks it had infected. The virus would then execute the
user's DOS command. All this, unbeknownst to the user. [Ref.
18:p. 26]
When the counter hit four, the virus would erase
the hard disk, including the boot sector and the file
allocation table (FAT). The virus did leave two trails.
First, the date on the COMMAND.COM file would change. Second,
the write light would be on the disk being infected. [Ref.
18:p. 26]
The Jerusalem virus was hidden in the install
proir m on the master disk [Ref. 19:p. 26]. The virus made
the news because it was supposed to strike on Friday, the 13th
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of October. The virus did not cause major damage but
emphasized that the network infected had no preventions
against viruses.
The Internet worm downed over 60,000 PCs on the
Internet. The Internet is a worldwide network connecting
academic, business, and military computers. A worm is a type
of virus which reproduces itself. [Ref. 20:p. 74]
As the above viruses illustrated, viruses are
usually created for a specific software or hardware
environment [Ref. 21:p. 25]. "MS-DOS based viruses may tag
onto application programs such as .COM or .EXE files." [Ref.
21:p.26] This type of virus on DOS usually changes the file
size and date [Ref. 21:p. 26].
Computer viruses enter the system in two ways.
The user "enters an infected program into the system or
telecommunication link allows a virus to cross from one system
to another." [Ref. 17:p. 22] The second way is via telecom-
munications. "When telecommunications is the medium, dial-in
access is often found, because dial-in opens the system to a
sometimes hostile world." [Ref. 17:p. 22]
Even innocent activities can lead to a virus. An
employee may bring a program to work from a computer bulletin
board. Although the program is for personal use, the program
is infected and the virus attaches to the operating system.
[Ref. 17:p. 22]
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In summary, there are certain aspects of networks
that make networking a "virtual petri disk for breeding
computer infection." [Ref. 20:p. 73] Michael Reimer,
executive vice president of Cleveland-based Fountain Ware,
says "the one-to-one relationship between PCs and users is one
of the single greatest points of risk on the network." [Ref.
20:p. 73] Other points of entry for viruses include bulletin
boards and diskettes. The threats to the system are the
integrity of the database and service denial.
3. Communication
Remote connections are an easy and convenient manner
to connect to a network from home or another network. A local
area network with a modem capability can connect to another
network. Remote logins are convenient to take work home and
access the network from the user's personal computer. The
problem is that "anything extremely useful and convenient that
deals with sensitive data is a security disaster." [Ref.
22:p. 38]
The two major security problems with remote connec-
tions are illegal entrance by computer hackers and access to
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS).
Since access is easy for users, access is also easy
for the computer hacker. A problem with remote logins is that
hackers attempt random rumbers on the telephone until they
obtain lial tone and then enter the network or PC [Ref. 8:p.
105].
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Second, if access to a dial-out modem is easy,
uncontrolled download of files from the Bulletin Board Systems
(BBS) may occur. Bulletin boards are a primary source of
virus infection and many systems are toll calls [Ref. 8:p.
105]. Therefore, if dial-out lines are available, abuses may
occur without adequate controls [Ref. 22:p. 38].
4. Physical Security
An important consideration in the design of a LAN is
physical security. Physical security encompasses many areas
and has lasting effects on the operation of the network.
Physical security deals with locks, equipment and electrical
power to mention a few. The most comprehensive definition of
physical security is given by the Federal Property Management
Regulations.
Federal Property Management Regulations define
physical security as,
...the sum of construction features and the use of locks,
guards, badges, and similar measures to control access to a
facility (location) as well as the measures required to
protect personnel and property, including the structures
housing the computer, their contents, and related equipment,
from, but not limited to, damage from accident, fire, loss
of utilities, environmental hazards, and unauthorized
access. [Ref. 23:p. 41]
Physical security in this section is divided into




With the growth of computers at home, the chances
of stealing increases in the work environment. A defective
board from the home computer can be easily swapped at work for
a working board. Since the microcomputer is easy to access,
computer parts can be swapped or stolen undetected. [Ref.
24:p. 15]
"The highest security risk in a LAN is the
workstation." [Ref. 6:p. 52] The user has free access to
DOS-based workstations which is convenient for stealing of
sensitive data [Ref. 6:p. 52].
b. Servers
As discussed in Chapter III, the file server is
the heart of the LAN. Most servers are unprotected against
disk removal. Additionally, servers are subject to theft
because of physical size. Uncontrolled access to servers
could cause potential loss of data through misuse of the
server console [Ref. 6:p. 52].
Another concern with servers is using personal
computer clones.
Some LAN vendors repackage IBM Personal Computer AT
clones and call them servers. This can be a source of
problems, because a network server will be driven far harder
than any AT. It is best to look for a vendor who builds
minicomputer-like systems designed to work 24 hours a day for
years. [Ref. 25:p. 19]
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c. Diskette Dilemma
The diskette is the most common medium for the
input and output of information from the computer. The
advantage is that the diskettes are compact and easy to carry.
The disadvantages are that they can easily be copied, stolen
or damaged. [Ref. 24:p. 13]
The nroblem is that organizations place very
little control on diskettes. Labelled and unlabelled
diskettes are usually scattered around the working area of the
microcomputer. End-users do not place a priority on security
of diskettes. [Ref. 24:p. 13]
"Once the information is stored on the local disk,
there are typically no security processes in place to prevent
an unauthorized user from obtaining it." [Ref. 6:p. 51]
d. Cabling
Cable topology "is the basis for physical
security." [Ref. 25:p. 19] The two major standards for cable
topology are IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet) and IEEE 802.5 (token
ring). The selection of token ring or Ethernet will affect
reliability of the system. Token ring design has fewer active
components. [Ref. 25 :p. 19] Therefore, it is "easier to
locate and isolate problems on a token ring." [Ref. 25:p. 19]
The tradeoff is that Ethernet failures occur less often than
token ring [Ref. 25:p. 19]
Cabling is a major component of network stability and,
because of the capital investment involved, one that is
difficult to alter if improperly designed. Shortcuts
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degrade security in ways that are difficult to quantify and
correct. [Ref. 25:p. 19]
Cabling is not the area in which "low initial cost
should be a design objective because of operational and
security reasons." [Ref. 25:p. 19]
"Cable is one of the first and easiest places for
a LAN security breach to occur." [Ref. 14:p. 84] Copper-
based systems can be tapped easily. Twisted-pair or other
copper cable don't need contact with the cable to be tapped.
Instead, an electromagnetic pick-up and an antenna device can
be built for under $20. [Ref. 14:p. 84]
Another weak spot for LAN security is electromag-
netic signal leakage or emanations. The uabling and the
connectors, amplifiers and tap boxes leak a portion of the
signal. "These leaked signals can be turned into readable
data." [Ref. 14 :p. 84]
A not-so-obvious security problem is running
unshielded twisted-pair near electrical devices such as
electric pencil sharpeners [Ref. 26:p. 96] "Electromagnetic
radiation emanating from electromechanical and electronic
devices can crash your system." [Ref. 26:p. 96]
"Fiber is somewhat more secure, since the loss of
light caused by a tap is often detectable." [Ref. 14:p. 84]
Fiber optics is not free from tapping. Since a connection is
required to expand the network, the connections are the
possible weak point [Ref. 14:p. 84].
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e. Environment Damage
An important area in physical security is
electrical power and effects on the computer system. The
"quality and reliability of the network's electrical power
supply" must be considered for the LAN to function properly
[Ref. 27:p. 120].
A study completed by IBM and Bell Labs determined
"that power disturbances occur on the average of two times a
week for most commercial sites." [Ref. 27:p. 120] Addition-
ally, the studies determined "that a large proportion of
disturbances are generated within the building." [Ref. 27:p.
120]
A personal computer operates on 120 volt service.
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) define
steady-state voltages for 120 volt service "as a continuous
operation at a range from 108 to 125 volts alternating current
(VAC) for 120 VAC." [Ref. 27:p. 120] So, a personal computer
does not receive exactly 120 volts.
In the above mentioned study, the following power





- Spikes or impulses.
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"Sags are cycle-to-cycle decreases in the power
line voltage below 80 percent of the nominal value lasting
less than several seconds." [Ref. 27:p. 120]
A sag can cause two problems to the computer
system. If a sag occurs, "it causes the computer power supply
to detect low voltage on its output, resulting in computer
shutdown." [Ref. 27:p. 122] This could cause loss of data if
user was writing a file to storage at the time of the sag.
Power blackouts can cause similar problems to sags. [Ref.
27:p. 122].
The problem becomes more severe if the duration of
the sag "is approximately equal to the holdup time of the
power supply in the computer." [Ref. 27:p. 122] This can
"cause a reversal of the 'I' and '0' in memory, causing the
destruction of programs and data in RAM." [Ref. 27:p. 122]
"Surges are cycle-to-cycle increases in the power
line voltage above 110 percent of the nominal value lasting
less than several seconds." [Ref. 27:p. 120] Surges account
for the majority of hardware damage and can stress computer
components, especially power supplies [Ref. 27:p. 122].
Failures are a zero voltage or an outage. Fail-
ures can cause the same damages as sags.
"Oscillations or noise have a frequency range of
400 Hz to five KHZ, with beginning amplitude from 15 percent
and up to 100 plet of nominal line voltage." [Ref. 27 :p.
120] Oscillations rarely occur from wall receptacles.
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Oscillations cause computer power supply and other hardware
component damage. [Ref. 27:p. 122]
Spikes or impulses are an "over voltage superim-
posed on the line voltage waveform which lasts between 0.5 and
100 microseconds and has an amplitude over 100 percent of peak
line voltage." [Ref. 27:p. 120] Spikes "are rapid excursions
of voltage." [Ref. 27 :p. 122] Spike/transient suppressors
have become popular because spikes can cause destruction of
computer hardware or damage software [Ref. 27-p. 1211.
Table 4.1 summarizes the average frequency of
disturbances in the United States, as determined by the IBM
and Bell Labs studies. Power protection needs of a LAN
usually rely on wall receptacle power "rather than a dedicated
power line at the building entrance." [Ref. 27:p. 122]
5. Human-Related Security
The user is involved in many aspects of LAN security
"If data resides on a LAN of fewer than 20 workstations with
no connection to the outside world, how great is your
exposure?" [Ref. 8:p. 100] The risk and exposure may be
greater due to careless users than determined crackers [Ref.
8:p. 100].
The truth is "more data are lost and damaged through
carelessness than through planned intrusion." [Ref. 8:p. 100]




FREQUENCY OF POWER DISTURBANCES
DISTURBANCE TYPE OCCURRENCE PER MONTH




Power Failure 0.6 1.0
Oscillation 26.0 not recorded
Spike 1.0 2.0
All Disturbances
Per Week 7.5 1.8
Source: [Ref. 27:p. 120]
C. SUMMARY
Five areas were discussed and all play an integral part in
implementing a security policy for LANs. As discussed in this
chapter, the greatest security risk may be the user. Non-
malicious destruction of data by the user is a definite
concern. The following chapter examines the possible control
solutions to the security problems discussed in this chapter.
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V. CLASSIFICATION OF CONTROL SOLUTIONS F OP
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter surveys various control meaues in local
area networks. Although all the controls discussed may not be
indispensable, it is important to be aware of the security and
control issues when designing a local area network and
planning for future expansion.
The amount of security will depend upon the threat
perceived [Ref. 13:p. 29]. The most important area to
consider for control measures is the level of security
required for the network. The security level set will depend
upon the importance of the data, the network utilized, and the
availability of money [Ref. 13:p. 29]. "The level of security
your installation requires is a big factor in what network
operating system, security features and security equipment you
should install." [Ref. 6:p. 54]
Classification of security needs could be categorized into
three areas: low or no access control, medium access control,
or high access control [Ref. 6:p. 56].
If no security controls are required, any network
operating system (NOS) can function safely. Significant cost
savings could be made in low access control by peer-to-peer
architecture. [Ref. 6:p. 56]
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Table 5.1 is the LAN security spectrum and provides
examples of application types and suggested security features
for a LAN.
TABLE 5.1
THE LAN SECURITY SPECTRUM
SECURITY APPLICATIONS SECURITY FEATURES
REQUIREMENTS










High access Classified/ - Client-server








Source: [Ref. 6:p. 51]
A low security local area network can be characterized by
the following [Ref. 6:p. 563:
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- Peer-to-peer architecture.
- DOS disk format.
- Bootable workstations (local storage).
- No required directory in file access control.
- Shareable printers across the network.
The spectrum of PC LAN security is very wide. Possible
security features in a high access control are [Ref. 6:p. 56]:
- Dedicated file server.
- Non-MS-DOS disk format.
- Diskless workstations.
- Access control down to the lowest level possible file.
- Encryption of passwords.
- Security monitoring and accounting.
- Network encryption devices.
- Printers attached to secure file server.
- No remote login.
- Fault-tolerant design.
Most organizations are somewhere between the two extreme
levels of the security spectrum.





Physical access deals with the controlling access to
equipment. Logical access involves access to the data. This
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type of access is the responsibility of the network operating
system. [Ref. 6:p. 51] "It is via the NOS that 'logical'
control for information access is carried out." [Ref. 6:p.
51]
Password access to servers, input/output (I/O) rights to
directory or file structures, fault tolerance and user
accounting features are all part of the support provided by
a network operating system. [Ref. 6:p. 51]
Administrative controls involve upper management, the LAN
manager and the user. All thrc, --e integral elements in
designing a LAN.
Finally, the organization must assess the cost of the
control measures versus the loss of software or hardware.
"Security begins with an honest assessment of what you can
afford to lose and how likely you are to lose it." [Ref. 8:p.
100]
A control's cost should be less than the resulting
reduction in expected loss. This is dramatically indicated
by the caveat--one should not kill a fly with a sledge-
hammer. That is, a control may be effective, but it will
not be efficient. [Ref. 28:p. 14]
A good LAN security program involves prevention, detection
and recovery. This is graphically depicted in Figure 5.1.
This chapter examines these three areas.
B. PHYSICAL ACCESS
There are five methods of access control [Ref. 29:p. 202].
The first method is visual recognition of the individual by a
guard or receptionist located at the point of entry. Visual








Figure 5.1 A Security Model
control. The second method uses a key to lock or a badge or
card that activates some form of reader. Method three is
based on combination to a lock or a password. A handwritten
signature is the fourth method. The last method is based on
measuring elements of the human anatomy. This method is
called biometrics. [Ref. 29:p. 202]
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1. Locks
Locks are the basic level to deter physical tampering
of computer systems. The devices are inexpensive and range
from $20 to $100. [Ref. 30:p. 108] Devices are available
"that lock the PC's keyboard, on/off switch, backplate, or
cover screw or one that locks your PC itself to the desk,
floor, or any other permanent fixture." [Ref. 30:p. 108]
"The most basic form of physical security is keeping equipment
behind locked doors or bolting it to the floor." [Ref. 13:p.
29] This is a precaution for equipment being stolen.
Another method is to prevent physical access to the
data on the computer. The lock on most PC ATs is an example
of this measure. The PC AT lock is located in the front of
the computer. When the system is locked the computer can not
be booted and it is difficult to take off the computer cover.
Most people are concerned with losing the key and not being
able to use the computer so they do not lock the computer.
[Ref. 3 0:p. 111] As in a lot of security issues, the lock has
become more of - nuisance than a protector. A viable option
is to keep the file server in a secure room or closet. This
prevents direct access to the heart of the LAN.
Aarons and Raskin [Ref. 30:p. 108] state that board
swapping is the next wave in nonmalicious tampering. Board
swapping is malicious in an organization. "The best
protection against board swapping, tampering, and messing
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under the hoods are locks for the cover screw or backplate of
the PC." [Ref. 30:p. 108]
In summary, locks are important to reduce theft but
should be low profile. Otherwise, the PC may "look like a
prisoner on a chain gang." [Ref. 30:p. 108]
2. Diskless PCs
Diskless PCs are another method of securing a LAN.
Diskless PCs use no floppy or hard disk drive. The diskless
PCs make it difficult to load viruses onto the network. And
as important, "diskless PCs prevent users from stealing
corporate information or software." [Ref. 31:p. 86]
Diskless PCs stop individuals from loading virus-
infected software from bulletin boards and using unlicensed
software.
The diskless PCs have two disadvantages. First,
diskless PCs may have a hard time receiving acceptance due to
previously purchased computers in the organization.
Organizations desire to connect the computers already
available rather than adding additional cost for more
computers. Second, users need the capability to use the
microcomputers when the network is down. [Ref. 32:p. 58]
3. Biometrics
Biometrics uses characteristics of an individual's
body to gain access to a room or to a computer. The devices
measure information that is unique to a person such as
fingerprint, handprint, retina pattern, voice pattern or
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signature. The body characteristics of the user are stored as
models in the biometrics devices. Access is granted when the
user's body characteristics are compared to the information
stored in the biometrics device and confirmed. Access is
denied if there is no match. [Ref. 33:p. 90]
The convenience of biometrics is their simplicity
because there are no passwords, keys, badges to maintain or
remember. For example, the retina pattern device obtains a
scan of the blood vessel pattern in the retina. All
individuals have a unique retina pattern and once these are
verified, the user gains access. [Ref. 33:p. 90]
The major advantage of biometrics is the difficulty in
duplicating an individual's body characteristics. At present,
the major disadvantage of biometrics is the high cost. The
second disadvantage is that errors do occur in the system.
Errors usually occur for two reasons. First, the
quality of the measurement process is imprecise [Ref. 29:p.
202]. Second, "the human physical characteristics being
measured by these systems can vary significantly from day-to-
day and even within a particular day." [Ref. 29 :p. 202] An
illness by the user may cause a change in the metabolism to
affect the readings of the biometrics device [Ref. 29:p. 202].
Errors experienced by biometrics access control systems
usually are dealt with by permitting up to three attempts at
securing entry before an individual is denied access by the
device being used. When this occurs the individual involved
usually is required to telephone a designated individual
stationed within the controlled area and to secure admission
through this person. [Ref. 29:p. 203]
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A test was conducted to examine the reliability and
ease of use of various biometrics. The devices tested
included a retina verification device, a finger/thumb
verification device, a hand-geometry identification device and
a signature-verification device. The test results are shown
in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2
RESULTS OF BIOMETRICS READINGS
1st 2nd 3rd
Device Attempt Attempt Attempt Rejected
Eye 10
Finger 20 5
Thumb 12 10 2 1
Hand geometry 21 4
Signature 9 1
Biometrics are extremely accurate. The importance of
the initial entry measurements can not be over-emphasized.
Most devices at the end of the initial entry give a number for
the quality of the data. This usually determines ease of
access and how many attempts the user will have to try for
access.
The eye and the signature survey were conducted using
two separate days for testing with five attempts each day.
The finger, thumb and hand-geometry test involved one week of
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testing with five attempts completed each day. Each test
allowed three attempts at entrance before the device denied
access. The reason for a five-day test on these devices was
to determine if the day-to-day metabolism could change access.
It appeared that changes in metabolism had a small affect on
the results. The major discrepancy with the thumb device was
due to trying to determine the position for the thumb on the
device. Since the finger and thumb use the same device, the
thumb always overlapped the position holder. Unable to place
the thumb in the exact same position each day resulted in a
varying success rate.
The most secure system and easiest to use was the
retina verification device. The user was verified the first
time in a trial of ten attempts.
Signature verification equipment was the least secure
for biometrics security equipment. The author gained access
on signature on the first attempt every time. The problem was
one student was able to duplicate the rhythm of the signature
while copying the signature, and gain access. No other device
accepted forgeries.
As the prices drop for biometric devices, this
technology could be used in the start-up procedures for a
local area network. [Ref. 22:p. 43]
4. Passwords
One of the forms of user authentication is passwords.
Passwords are a simple and effective method to control access
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to a computer and network. "A user must know a legitimate
password to gain access to the system." [Ref. 14:p. 84]
Because of the user's tendency to share passwords and keep the
same password for years, passwords must be managed.
Selecting passwords correctly is fundamental to any
security program. The object is to select a password of which
other users and computer hackers can not make an educated
guess and predict the password. The problem is users pick
easy passwords sich as first name, last name or display the
password directly on the computer. [Ref. 14:p. 84]
Perhaps 10% of all computer accounts use between 50 and
60 common passwords. This reduces the effective number of
passwords from 208 billion to 600--which are very good odds
indeed. This is an area where hackers use custom computer
programs. Their machine can call your system over the phone
lines. [Ref. 34:p. 42]
The following list of do's and don't's are presented
to assist in password development [Ref. 35:p. 6]:
- Don't use your login name in any form (password system
may have a login name such as your name).
- Don't use your first or last name in any form.
- Don't use your spouse's or child's name.
- Don't use other information that is easily obtained,
including license plate numbers, telephone numbers,
social security numbers, the brand of your car, the name
of the street you live on, etc.
- Don't use a password of all digits, or all the same
letter that could significantly decrease the search time
for a cracker.
- Don't use a word contained in dictionaries, spelling
lists, or other lists of words.
- Don't use a password shorter than six characters.
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- Do use a password with mixed-case alphabetic.
- Do use a password with non-alphabetic characters, e.g.,
digits or punctuation.
- Do use a password that is easy to remember, so you don't
have to write it down.
- Do use a password that you can type quickly. This makes
it harder for someone to steal your password by watching
over your shoulder.
There are many different strategies for selecting a
password. These various strategies for picking passwords are
summarized in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 provides example of
different strategies and the security level of each strategy.
The first strategy is to have no password or type in
the words "password or XXXX." The second strategy is to pick
something easy to remember like "sex, drugs, etc." These
passwords are easy to remember and popular but have a low
security level. [Ref. 34:p. 42]
The third strategy is to have a random generator pick
passwords using upper-case, lower-case, numbers and punctua-
tion. An example of this would be "Z#Lu%p*v." This method
would apparently be the best method. The problem is the
password is so random that users can not memorize the code and
must write the password down. Usually, this is done next to
the computer. The protection against attack is poor and not
a recommended strategy. [Ref. 34:p. 44]
The fourth method is to use "long, but misspelled,
common English words." (Ref. 34:p. 423 A .example of this
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1 2 3 4 5
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words? select random but mis- random
Weren't their pass- spelled, pass
they own words. common phrases.
install- pass- English




Security Nil. Can Low. Low. High. Very
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is ly words are not Provides
broken broken are so likely good
by by random to be combin-
unintel- intelli- that cracked nation
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11-year- year- ees can amateurs and









Examples No Sex 6fTa.8Ac Computre IsjtAi53
password
PASSWORD Money P[q41Mn expandly WRa81?Ge
XXX drugs lKaH%%u rivrerun TBlatStd
Protec- None None Poor to Good Very
tion none good
Conclu- Not Not Not Recom- Highly
sion recom- recom- recoin- mended recom-
mended mended mended mended
Source: [Ref. 3 4 :p. 42]
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in this strategy is high and the passwords are hard to
duplicate. [Ref. 34:p. 42]
The last and fifth strategy is using pseudo-random,
pseudo-phrase passwords. This strategy is "theoretically
almost as secure as true random generation." [Ref. 34:p. 44]
"The user invents an eight-word phrase and enters the first
letters of each word." [Ref. 34:p. 44] Examples of this
strategy are provided below [Ref. 34:p. 42]:
- IsjtAi53 = "I stupidly joined the Army in 53."
- WRa8l?Ge = "Wong's Restaurant at 81st? Great eats."
- TBlatStd = "Twas Bril Lig and the Sly they doves" did
gyre and gymble... (thanks to Lewis Carroll).
The Department of Defense also emphasized certain
areas for passwords. The recommendations from DoD Password
Management Guideline include [Ref. 36:p. 2]:
- Users should be able to change their own passwords.
- Passwords should be machine-generated rather than user-
created.
- Certain audit reports (e.g., date and time of last login)
should be provided by the system directly to the user.
Finally, a password policy should be developed.
First, passwords should not be written down or stored on a
file on the computer. By writing the password down or storing
in a file the user is dependent on the security of the file or
paper. Second, users should not give passwords to others. By
giving out the password, the user does not know if the
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password will be distributed further. Third, passwords must
be changed periodically, about twice a year. [Ref. 35:p. 6]
C. RECOVERY CONTROLS
1. Backups
Backup procedures involve making copies of the
programs and the data files. Backups represent the ultimate
protection against infections from viruses and employees who
accidentally delete files and erase entire directories.
There are different types of files that should be
considered in the backup system. These files include [Ref.
37 :p. 105]:
- Hidden files containing the master lists of all network
names and passwords.
- Security files, which list the rights and privileges of
each network user.
- Files that have been stored by individual network users
on their hard disks.
When backing up three types of files, a LAN backup
"requires enough storage space for all of the data on the
LAN's shared hard disk, and in some cases, individual users'
hard disks as well." [Ref. 37:p. 97]
There are two types of backup options: backup to disk
or backup to tape. Backup to floppy disk takes a considerable
amount of time and an abundance of disk. The second method
under-disk is to backup to another hard disk or to a removable
hard disk. A removable hard disk enables the user to replace
the broken hard disk easily. The only problem is that current
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removable hard disks only have a capacity of 4C megabytes
(MB). [Ref. 38:p. 23]
Backup to tape is the most popular method. The
advantages of tape backup are convenience and less expense.
The tape devices can be mounted internally in the 5-1/4 inch
slots on the PC, but most are attached externally [Ref. 38:p.
231.
A new option is optical disk. This option is better
used for storage of data than backup since the data on Write-
Once-Read-Many can not be changed [Ref. 38:p. 233.
Backups should be completed as the situation demands
and a grandfather system should be used. In extreme cases
backups could be performed several times during the day, but
at the minimum once a day. [Ref. 8:p. 107]
Grandfathering uses a system that insures important
data is not lost because of various problems including
viruses. First, backup every file in the LAN and this is the
baseline. If the entire system fails, this is the backup to
restore the system. [Ref. 8:p. 107]
Second, make daily backups, which you keep until the end
of the week. At week's end, you do the weekly backup, which
you keep for a month. Re-turn the daily tapes to use for
next week's backups.
Now, each month, do a monthly backup, which you keep for
a year. Thus, you have four dailies. On Friday, you keep
a weekly. At the end of the month, you have four weeklies.
At the end of the year, you have 12 monthlies. And you
always have the baseline backup. Only backup files that
change (incremental backup). Then when you need to restore
an entire drive, you start with the baseline and Lhen update
with the most recent incremental backup. If you find a
virus in your backup, you can move to an earlier backup
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(that's why you grandfather) and the worst you'll have to do
is reenter a month's worth of data. [Ref. 8:p. 107]
The backup is usually not perceived as crucial until
data are lost. With a local area network the system must be
designed with a backup. An effective backup system is
required because of the many users and amount of important
information in the databases. [Ref. 37:p. 97] As will be
discussed later in this chapter, more information is lost by
nonmalicious employees than by viruses and stealing.
In summary, backup is only effective if done on a
regular basis. "A good rule of thumb is backup the files that
change every day, and backup the program executable once a
week." [Ref. 38:p. 24]
2. Audit Trails
Once an individual penetrates the system, "security
issues revolve around detecting breaches and identifying who
is committing them." [Ref. 14:p. 88]
An audit trail is a program that constantly records
information about what is going on the network--who is
logging in and out, who is running what application who is
deleting what file. It's often possible to detect and
identify an intruder with an audit trail. [Ref. 14:p. 8C]
Audit trails have two drawbacks. An obvious problem
is that someone must have the time to read all the recorded
information and understand it. "In a LAN, people record their
hearts out but nobody ever looks at it," says Peter Krauss of
LAN VAR LAN Services (N,2w York, NY). The LAN manager should
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review audit trial at least once a week for anomalies. [Ref.
14:p. 88]
Another problem is that audit trails use a large
amount of disk space. This disk space problem can be reduced
by monitoring the network at certain hours. Of course,
restricting audit trail hours reduces security. [Ref. 31:p.
88].
Since every transaction is recorded on the network, an
audit trail is an effective security tool. [Ref. 31:p. 88]
3. Disaster Recovery Plans
Disaster recovery is for a major catastrophe such as
a fire, flood, earthquake or disk crash. The organization
must determine how extensive the recovery system should be.
As mentioned in the backup section, "recovery schemes depend
upon the importance of data, the quantity of data, your budget
and the time the system can be down." [Ref. 39:p. 32]
A disaster recovery plan may involve fault-tolerant
features. Fault tolerance is "protection of data against
hardware failure." [Ref. 6:p. 541 Fault-tolerant features
"include redundant servers, hardware, disks, utilities and
files." [Ref. 39:p. 32]
Two methods of fault tolerance include disk bad-track
handling and mirrored disks. Disk bad-track handling
recognizes that "every disk has flaws and important for
software to deal with this transparently." [Ref. 6:1p. 54)
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Mirrored disks is "writing data to two separate disk
drives so both drives will contain the same logical data."
[Ref. 6:p. 54]
Before considering expensive fault-tolerance features,
one should consider the basics. The basic steps before fault-
tolerance systems are power protection and tape backup. Since
the servers are constantly on, the servers should be protected
by an uninterruptable power supply (UPS). [Ref. 40:p. 60] "A
UPS is basically a huge battery." [Ref. 40:p. 202] When the
power is lost, the UPS starts to work.
Additionally, fault tolerance does not take the place
of tape backup. For example, if a virus infects one disk, the
other disk is automatically infected with disk mirroring.
[Ref. 40:p. 60]
D. DATA SECURITY CONTROL
1. Virus Prevention and Detection
Prevention is the most important area when dealing
with viruses. Knowledge of proper procedures and anti-virus
programs can save the organization many headaches.
The first preventive method is to "limit network
access to legitimate users." [Ref. 41:p. 78] This invclves
proper password security procedures and an operating system
that grants access to data on a need-to-use basis [Ref. 41:p.
783.
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Secondly, anti-virus software is on the market to deal
with viruses. "Common elements of anti-virus software are
programs that monitor, detect and protect against virus
infection." [Ref. 21:p. 28]
Pirated programs and free software should not be used.
These programs could carry a virus. Ensure the anti-virus
programs purchased are not viruses in disguise themselves.
To prevent this, "centralize software purchasing or have an
approved vendor list." [Ref. 18:p. 27]
The computer bulletin board systems (BBS) are
susceptible to viruses. Restrict the use of dial-out lines
and restrict access to the BBS. Software is available to
restrict the access to only approved telephone numbers. since
viruses run from executable files, files ending in .EXE or
.COM, users should not copy executable programs from the
bulletin boards. [Ref. 8:p. 105]
Besides anti-virus programs and using original
software, the most important element is to test the software
on a separate personal computer before installing on the
network. By testing on an isolated computer this precludes
the virus from infecting the entire network. [Ref. 41:p. 78]
Preventive measures for viruses are listed in Table
5.4.
If the prevention methods fail, how are the viruses
detected? If the virus is complex, the virus may z be
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TABLE 5.4
PREVENTIVE MEASURES FOR VIRUSES
1. Limit network access to legitimate users.
2. Centralize software purchasing or have an
"approved" vendor list.
3. Don't use unknown software.
4. Use a write tab on "suspect" disk.
5. Instruct employees on the dangers of viruses.
6. Make all .EXE and .COM files on PCs read only.
7. Test all new software on an isolated system before
loading on network.
8. Make working copies of all original diskettes.
9. Check system programs, utilities, and applications
regularly for unusual behavior.
10. Remove any suspicious programs with a utility that
completely overwrites the disk space formerly
occupied by the deleted files.
11. Make frequent backup copies of files.
12. Log all access or attempted accesses to the
network.
13. Never boot a hard disk system with a floppy disk.
14. Use Anti-virus programs.
15. Restrict access to bulletin board systems.
Sources: [Refs. 41:p. 72; 18:p. 27]
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detected until it is too late. A few methods for detecting
virus are [Ref. 18:pp. 28-29]:
- Check file sizes against a previously established table.
- Use utilities or programs that search all program files
for strange text.
- Set system clock to the future.
- Look for strange files on the system.
Once a victim of a virus, the computer should be
pulled off the network and the virus isolated. If the virus
is detected early, then the backup tapes can be used for
restart. Defore reloading, turn off the power to the system
to ensure that random access memory (RAM) is cleared. If the
virus is complicated, a computer expert should be called.
[Ref. 18:p. 29]
Backups are the primary method of recovering from a
virus. Copies of original vendor software should be made as
a backp.
Tf viruses cannot be prevented or cured, it is essential
that the means be available to recover from them. Only
thorc-gh backup can make that possible. [Ref. 17 :p. 23]
Finally, anti-virus programs alone are inadequate to
provide the necessary prevention against viruses. To preclude
future viruses a strong prevention program including anti-
virus p-ograms and backups are recommended. The bottom line
is viru.ses recuire efrective controls of software and
responsiole personnel. "Effective, security-conscios,,
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vigilant management is the solution to computer viruses, as it
is all computer security problems." [Ref. 17:p. 23]
2. Operating System
Once access has been gained into the network, controls
should be set for the type of data the user can access.
Currently, most network operating systems have file security
systems. [Ref. 14:p. 85] The file security system enables
the LAN manager to "determine directories and even individual
files a given user can have access to." [Ref. 14:p. 85] The
LAN manager can also "set the type of access, determining
whether the user can only read a file or whether he has full
read/write access." [Ref. 14:p. 85]
In this way, there can be a whole hierarchy of security
within a system, allowing certain users access to
directories A, B, C and the accounting database, while
others have access to directories D, E and F and the
inventory database. Access must also be controlled to
programs. There must be a way to prevent users from running
programs they do not--or should not--need. [Ref. 14:pp. 85-
87]
3. Encryption
If the data are valuable or classified, then the lines
should be secure. One way of doing this is encryption.
Encryption codes the information before the data are sent on
the network. Encryption "is one of the best security methods
for local links." [Ref. 22:p. 38] "For remote connections,
encryption is the only answer to keep information secure."
[Ref. 22:p. 38]
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Encryption is not widespread because it costs money.
"An encryption program costs twice the price of a LAN card."
[Ref. 14:p. 88] An unclassified or low security-level system
would not require encryption of data. Presently, encryption
slows the network by the time required to code and decode
messages. Many LAN managers just encrypt passwords because
encryption is expensive. [Ref. 14:p. 88]
E. COMMUNICATION
When a legitimate need for dial out is required, use a
communication server. As discussed in Chapter III, the
communication server allows the users to connect to other
networks through one modem. A combination facsimile and modem
board provides "the advantage of making both dial out and fax
available to all network users." [Ref. 8:p. 105]
All users rarely need outside connections. When they
do, however, use the communications server approach and
write scripts that automate (and restrict) the outside
numbers to which users can connect. [Ref. 8:p. 105]
Three basic rules apply when using remote access in LANs
[Ref. 22:p. 381:
- Should have dial back where the system (modem) dials the
authorized user back after calling.
- Turn the modem off when not in use.
- Limit the number of tries with the wrong password.
The most important rule for remote access is "no outside
access when dealing with sensitive data." [Ref. 22:p. 44]
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F. CABLING AND ELECTRICAL DESIGN
1. Cabling
The type of cabling is an important security decision.
Fiber optic cable is "far more resistant to wiretapping than
other media and should be considered for applications where
security is important." [Ref. 15:p. 227]
The biggest benefit from fiber optics in terms of data
security, may be noise immunity. Since fiber optic cable
uses light as a transmission source, it neither emanates nor
is it susceptible to emanations from other sources. Fiber
optic cables may be run next to electric motors without
experiencing any interference from the motor's field. As
long as the cable is physically, it is virtually impossible
to tap. [Ref. 42:p. 140]
Additionally, fiber optic physical security is "less
expensive than for traditional wire cables since fiber optics
require no electrical shielding." [Ref. 8:p. 1403
Connections is another concern with cabling.
By placing all connections in a locked wire closet and
providing diagnostic taps and tools, the system is protected
against vandalism, troubleshooting is faster and the network
can be restored to service more rapidly in the event of a
cable,tap or access unit problem. [Ref. 25:p. 19]
Laying the cable is an important area in designing a
network. Although laying the cable the shortest distance is
ideal, it may be more headaches than it is worth. Ideally,
the LAN manager needs to access the cable for troubleshooting
if required. For this reason proper documentation of cabling
layout is required. [Ref. 39:p. 33]
The cable tips are summarized below [Ref. 43:pp. 124-
125):
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- Double up each line. Run two cables instead of one.
- Use wall plates. Looks better also keeps tension off the
drop cable.
- Avoid running copper cabling near power wires and
florescent fixtures. Watch out for electromagnetic
energy. An electric pencil sharpener can wreck havoc on
a network.
- Think about future requirements.
- Check the codes and regulations before installing cable
* Local fire codes.
* National Fire Protection Association Standards.
* The National Electrical Code (NEC).
* Local and national building codes.
* Uniform Building Code.
* FCC regulations against Radio Frequency Interference
(RFI) and Electromagnetic Interference (EMI).
- Avoid placing cable in areas where it can be damaged.
Realistically, tapping an unclassified network would
be considered a low probability and risk. As discussed, the
shielding of the cable is an important element for noise
immunity. In designing a low-risk LAN, the noise factor
should be more of a consideration than tapping threats.
2. Electrical Power
Electrical power is an important security area for
LANs. Electrical protection should cover the file server and
other critical systems.
An IBM study determined "that uninterruptable power
systems (UPS) are required for the reliable, continuous
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operation of electrical equipment." [Ref. 27:p. 123] On-line
UPS may not be cost-effective for all computer applications.
At the minimum, surge power protectors and back up power are
required.
As depicted in Table 4.1, there are 1.8 power distur-
bances per week from wall receptacles. Since PC-based power
is from wall receptacles, this is a vulnerability for
equipment operating continuously as a file server. An on-line
UPS is a cost-effective solution when the equipment is running
on a continuous basis such as the file server [Ref. 27:p.
124].
G. MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
A neglected aspect of LAN security is the LAN manager
[Ref. 6:p. 52]. The LAN manager is "responsible for setting
up passwords, access rights, recovery and backup procedures,
and monitoring the system for security violations." [Ref.
6:p. 52]
"It doesn't matter whether you have a two-node LAN or a
200-node LAN, the LAN needs a LAN administrator." [Ref. 26:p.
96] Although managing an entry-level LAN is only a collateral
job, someone must be responsible for monitoring the system.
It is important to "train more than one person as the LAN
manager." [Ref. 39:p. 33] Otherwise, if the LAN goes down
when the LAN manager is gone, all the work stops. "A LAN
manager must understand DOS and the networking operating
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system, know how to do backups and to troubleshoot problems."
[Ref. 39:p. 33]
Management should evaluate their microcomputer environment
to ensure that the proper controls exist. Management should
[Ref. 44:p. 27]:
- Develop and disseminate data security policies and
procedures to all employees.
- Analyze information in terms of its confidentiality and
sensitivity.
- Implement appropriate security measures over information
deemed confidential or sensitive.
Management must "balance ease of use with security
controls." [Ref. 45:p. 28] "Security measures must be
designed in a way which will encourage user compliance."
[Ref. 45:p. 78] Access control measures such as "log on
security, passwords, physical access controls--terminal lock
and key, card-reading devices or biometrics--and terminal
identification are of no help if they are ignored or
circumvented." [Ref. 45:p. 78] The organization must "strike
a balance between absolute impregnability and user
convenience." [Ref. 45:p. 78]
Basic security objectives and security requirements
should be "identified at the beginning to avoid needless
replication and to conserve resources." [Ref. 46:p. 24]
"Security is as much about preventing data loss from
errors as it is abouL preventing intrusion." [Ref. 8:p. 108]
"Security is meant to keep your business your ibusiness. But
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it's also meant to help users do their jobs safely and
conveniently." [Ref. 8:p. 108]
Security is an attitude. Security must be emphasized from
top managemenc down. Time allowance for training and security
awareness is essential. A large portion of damage to
computers is unintentional and non-malicious from untrained
personnel. Security awareness for new personnel is required
when introducing proper procedures for using microcomputers
and networks. "Training is expensive, but not nearly
expensive as not training." [Ref. 47:p. 24] The most
effective security measure is the trained user.
Training is an important control ingredient. Initially,
users should be grouped by skill levels: "whether they are
new, familiar with DOS, familiar with word processing, or
experienced users." [Ref. 39:p. 33] Then the application
courses can be designed for different skill levels.
Experienced users may only need training on areas unique to
LAN operations. [Ref. 39:p. 33]
"Many control problems in the microcomputer environment
are due to inadequate computer training." [Ref. 44 :p. 26]
Users without training "are not aware of pertinent backup,
programming and security issues." [Ref. 44:p. 26] "Training
employees on the proper uses of a computer system and the
responsibilities associated with its use is the key variable
in the development of a well-controlled environment." [Rer.
44:p. 26]
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"Surprisingly, simpler controls are often better able to
withstand the tests of time because they are understood by
management and others who must support them." [Ref. 28:pp.
14-15]
The final decision on LAN configuration "becomes a matter
of cost, support of required features, ease of installation
and require. idministration overhead." [Ref. 6:p. 56]
The bottom line for security is very simple. Decide
what you realistically need in security with your risk and
exposure assessment and then apply the security measures.
Have a disaster recovery plan and a written security
document that lays down policies and procedures. [Ref. 8:p.
108]
Finally, "plan your network with an eye to the future."
[Ref. 42:p. 141]
H. THE USER
Without the understanding and cooperation of the user of
the system, the security policy and control solutions will be
inadequate. The user will either suppress the controls or
suppress tl- automated system [Ref. 48:p. Lx]. When designing
a LAN system, the effects of security on the user must be
considered. "Security imposes restrictions which can cause
friction." [Ref. 13:p. 30]
Personnel can become frustrated by security measures and
attempt to circumvent the controls [Ref. 13:p. 30]. Users
will not conform to restrictions if they don't understand the
reasons.
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A solution to this problem "is to motivate people to
cooperate." [Ref. 13:p. 30] Mike Hurwicz suggests the
following actions [Ref. 13:p. 30]:
- Explain the reasons 'or security procedures. When people
understand why cont-ols are necessary, they are more
likely to cooperate,
- Make it clear to prospective and current employees that
everyone is expected to cooperate. Establish clear
consequences for failure to cooperate.
- Be specific about policies and procedures. Write them
down and give everyone a copy.
- Don't overdo it.
Says Hurwic:, "Enlisting the support of employees is
probably the single most cost-effective security precaution a
company can take." [Ref. 13:p. 30]
End users have a security responsibility. Users must
realize the "importance of keeping passwords to themselves and
logging off their computers at lunch time and also at the end
of the wor'day."' [Ref. 45:p. 78] At the end of the day or
when no one is workinq at the station, sensitive information
should be cleared from the workstation including what is
residing on accessible memory. Sensitive material must be
properly protected and secured. [Ref. 23:p. 42]
Any security program must involve the user. The user must
be indoctrinated in why these procedures are necessary.
Additionally, the user must be security awareness trained.
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Table 5.5 is a list of responsibilities that the user




1. Properly securing sensitive information/data and
media to protect against unauthorized destruction
and access.
2. Protecting PC equipment and media against the
detrimental effects of dirt, heat, coffee,
magnets, etc.
3. Labeling PC-generated information/reports to
differentiate them from normal data processing-
produced data to include the creator's name, date,
source, cop number, etc.
4. Properly documenting programs to facilitate the
turnover of files to new users.
5. Complying with software licensing agreements.
6. Making backup copies of essential files and
programs.
7. Preparing labels for PC media. (There should be a
standard labeling format for the entire
organization.)
8. Prohibiting unauthorized access to information.
Source: [Ref. 23 :p. 41]
Often the users comply with the hard regulations and
rules, but the simple and common sense security measures are
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often neglected. Common sense can go a long way to assist in
the prevention of security problems.
The link between management controls and the user are
training, trust and cooperation. Figure 5.2 depicts the User
Security Asset Triangle. To have an effective user security
program all three areas of the triangle must be developed.
For example, training users leads to cooperation and develops
a trust of management.
Training
Trust Cooperation
Figure 5.2 User Security Asset Triangle
in summary, the user is the most important asset and also
the greatest liability [Pef. 18:p. 30]. The organization's
security program is only as good as the user. Leaving
pass.words attached to the computer and the key in the computer
are habits that should be avoided.
I . SUMMAPY
This chapter has emphasized the prevention, detection and
recovery elements as an integral part of system design. The
fundIamental elements of a LAN design incl ude access
protectio , communication protection, management controls,
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user interface and a recovery system. Each of these areas
must be examined to ensure a good LAN design.
As discussed in this chapter, access protection involves
both hardware and software. The hardware includes locks,
keys, diskless PCs and biometrics. The software control
access includes passwords and access restrictions to files and
directories.
The communication protection to consider is call-back
devices for verification and restricting dial-up capability.
Management controls and the user interface can not be
overemphasized. The LAN manager is key to monitoring the
system for security problems. A properly trained and educated
user can eliminate many security problems.
Finally, the recovery system is an essential part of the
design. Backups are required to avoid lost data, user
mistakes and disaster recovery.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The primary research question was to identify the security
problems and control issues in local area networks (LANs).
The aim of this thesis was to emphasize the prevention,
detection and recovery elements as an integral part of LAN
system design. A case study was designed to help officers
stationed at naval patrol aviation squadrons gain an
appreciation of the security issues in an unclassified network
environment. Chapter III introduced the reader to basic LAN
terminology including LAN architecture, topology and access
procedures, and transmission media. Various security problems
in LANs were discussed in detailed in Chapter IV. The primary
issued related to hardware security resides in the fact that
current systems lack built-in security mechanisms. Physical
security has been a neglected area in implementing LANs.
Effective measures should be taken to protect cabling,
workstations and electrical power from unpredictable damage.
As far as software is concerned, license violations, lack of
robustness of PC-based operating systems, and viruses remain
to be the most critical aspects. Also, illegal access by
computer hackers presents a serious threat to remote
connections. Finally, human-related security problems remain
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the utmost issue to be addressed. Chapter V proposed a
taxonomy of control solutions for LANs. Depending on the
security spectrum, various physical, logical and administra-
tive control measures could be devised. Password handling,
recovery procedures including backups are amongst cost
effective control strategies. It is not unusual to neglect
LAN management as one aspect of LAN security. A management
control plan should be carefully designed to appropriately
empower the LAN's managers, and to promote users' awareness
and involvement in a security program.
B. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROPOSED CASE STUDY
The following security concerns are discussed in the case
study:
- Diskette dilemma.
- Software theft/license violations.
- Access to computer bulletin boards.
- Physical access controls (locks).
- Password strategy.
- Viruses.
- The careless user.
- Electrical power.
- LAN manager controls.
- Recovery systems (backups, audit trails).





Although "Ringer's" recommendations are adequate, a few
recommendations have flaws. For example, in the case,
"Ringer" suggested incorrectly that the anti-virus program
should be installed on the network. No software should be
authorized on the network until tested on an isolated personal
computer. Anti-virus programs although considered important
in the prevention of viruses, when considered alone are
inadequate. Management controls and the trained user are key
elements in preventing viruses.
Another problem discussed by "Ringer" is password
strategy. Password systems are doomed to fail if the codes
are eas to remember.
LAN Manager was another topic of discussion in the case.
As discussed in the thesis, a LAN of more than three computers
require a LAN Manager. a job may be only collateral, but it
is needed. The LAN Manager must monitor the network, check
audit trails and set up backup procedures. Audit trails are
important to read at least once a week but preferably once a
day.
Tempest is for keeping RF signals contained. As discussed
in the case, this has nothing to do with whether classified
information can be installed on the network. Classified
information should not be filed on the hard disk.
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There is no optimal solution to designing a security
system for a LAN. The level of security depends on the
perceived threats and the risks. A risk assessment is
required when changing the computer structure of an
organization. After the risk assessment is completed, the
security measures can be implemented.
Organizational objectives pertaining to security issues
should be carefully weighted and prioritized. Finally, common
sense is an important ingredient in designing a security
system. Tight controls may reduce productivity and cause
friction in the working environment. On the other hand,
loose controls can result in security problems. A middle
ground should be established.
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are at least two areas of study that could be
suggested for future research.
First, all security program requires a risk assessment to
identify and assess the exposures and their potential damages.
The organization must determine the level of security
perceived as necessary. A possible area for research is to
incorporate risk assessment in the domain of LAN security
along OPNAVINST 5239.1A guidelines.
Second, the materials discussed in this thesis should
provide enough information to implement a decision support
systems that would comply with the C2 level of security by
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1992 in the Navy. The criteria classes of security are set
from a level of class D for minimal protection to class A for
the highest level of security. Class C2 involves
discretionary access control, audit trails, and identification
and authentication of users.
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